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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS

FCC MELLE

1201 Third Avenue, Suite 3600 Seattle, Washington 98101 (206) 621-1351

June 18, 1993

Ms. Donna R. Searcy, Secretary Federal Communications Commission 1919 M Street NW Washington, DC 20554

Re: Petition for Reconsideration Submitted by Northland Communications Corporation MM Docket 92-266 Rate Regulation

Dear Ms. Searcy:

Enclosed herewith for filing with the Commission are one original and sixteen copies of the Northland Communications Corporation's Petition for Reconsideration, which is being filed in response to the Commission's Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking released on May 3, 1993 in the above-referenced proceeding.

Very truly yours,

James A. Penney

Vice President and General Counsel

Enclosures

cc: Robert L. Pettit, Esq. (w/encl.)

Steven R. Effros, Esq. (w/encl.)

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BEFORE THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20554

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

In the Matter of

Implementation of Sections of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992

Rate Regulation

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FCC NIA L B. C. L. D.

To: The Commission

PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION SUBMITTED BY NORTHLAND COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION

Date: June 19, 1993

Northland Communications Corporation herein petitions the Commission to reconsider certain provisions of its Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking released on May 3, 1993 (the "Order") in the above-referenced proceeding.

I. Introduction.

Northland Communications Corporation ("Northland") is a small MSO that serves approximately 150,000 subscribers in nine states. "Northland" is not a consolidated entity; rather it is composed of 15 separate cable operating companies, each of which is financed and operated on a stand-alone basis. Northland's systems all serve rural areas. Under the definition of "small cable operators" advanced by the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the United States Small Business Administration, as reported at paragraph 566 of the Order, each of Northland's systems would be considered "small." Using the

Commission's definition (i.e., fewer than 1,000 subscribers), approximately 40 percent of Northland's systems would be considered "small." Notwithstanding the terminology used, Northland's systems are small businesses and will have extreme difficulty withstanding the revenue losses mandated by the rate regulation scheme developed in the Order. For that reason and the other matters discussed below, Northland petitions the Commission to reconsider the Order and to adopt a more balanced and fair approach to regulation. Northland believes the Commission must develop and adopt a regulatory scheme that does not unreasonably burden small cable operators.

II. The Commission's Regulatory Scheme Will Produce a Wide Array of Undesirable Consequences.

A. First Amendment Concerns - Preferred Speakers.

Foremost among the undesirable (and hopefully unintended) consequences of the <u>Order</u> is the profoundly chilling effect the rate regulation scheme will have on cable operators' First Amendment rights. Northland believes the Commission's actions in the <u>Order</u> are tantamount to the imposition of direct governmental controls on cable operators' speech and create categories of unfavored and preferred speakers.

Several Northland systems now provide a locally produced news and information show, "Northland Cable News", which in many cases is the only local news available on a daily basis to the systems' cable communities. Rate regulation will have a significant negative effect on the nature and content of the programming on Northland Cable News.

Because the Commission's benchmark scheme gives no consideration to the costs associated with the development and carriage of specialized, locally-produced programming, Northland may be forced to reduce the amount and/or scope of the programming or to discontinue the service completely. Future launches of Northland Cable News, which had been planned for over a dozen cable systems in 1993 and 1994, have been put on indefinite hold and may be scrapped altogether depending on the outcome of the Commission's actions in its reconsideration of the Order.

The Commission's regulatory scheme discourages the production

The imposition of these penalties has no basis in cost and provides a disincentive for local access, news and regional programming, which in turn limits local speakers as opposed to a benchmark methodology that creates preferred speakers. The benchmark methodology could use, for example, density of subscribers per mile of plant or system channel capacity as factors that have a direct correlation to cost and make no preference for a particular category of speaker.

B. First Amendment Concerns - Editorial Discretion.

sports channel on the basic tier would be forced under the <u>Order</u> to pass the cost of an additional sports channel to <u>all</u> subscribers, even those who do not desire more sports programming. Implementation of specialty tiers, however, offers the sports fan additional programming without imposing increased charges on the non-sports fan. Similarly, implementing a specialty tier allows a system to provide services such as MTV, which often is abhorred by the majority in small, rural communities, but strongly desired by others.

Because narrow-niche programming is subject to high license

carried on a low-penetrated tier of service. In this regard, the Commission's scheme is contrary to the underlying general philosophy of First Amendment jurisprudence and the heretofore articulated philosophy of the Commission, which has been to encourage the broadest diversity of speakers. The Commission's regulations should not deter operators from adding programming to their systems.

The single-price-per-channel adopted in the Commission's benchmark methodology not only renders a specialty tier uneconomic from a cost standpoint, but it also may lead to less equitable tier charges to the consumer. Consider the following example: A hypothetical 30-channel system currently contains a five-channel specialty tier consisting of American Movie Classics, USA Network, TNT, MTV, and Sports South. Analysis yields a "Maximum Initial Permitted Rate per Channel" of 62.9¢ (unbundled) which in turn leads to an allowable tier charge of approximately \$3.15. Because program vendors penalize operators for low-penetration specialty tier carriage, however, the program costs of this specialty tier would be more than double the \$3.15 allowable rate under the benchmark.

Two viable options exist for the cable operator. The specialty tier may be "melted" into a lower level of service, or the specialty tier channels may be eliminated altogether. The addition of the

per Channel" of 71.9¢, and an allowable increase of \$2.25 in the rate charged to the system's subscribers on the lower level of service. The basic service tier subscriber has no change in the number of channels received, the specialty tier subscriber no longer receives his or her desired programming and both pay more for their basic cable service.


Summary and Solution to Problem.

The benchmark system, as it now stands, imposes penalties for giving broader choice to the consumer and essentially prohibits specialty tiers. This is not necessary when the Commission could easily craft an effective regulatory method to meet rate control objectives. Separate benchmarks should be established for basic tiers with over 85 percent penetration. These benchmarks should be independent of specialty tiers. Specialty tiers should be regulated on a case-by-case basis that eventually leads to benchmarks (constructed by examining costs) which provide economic incentives for adding choice. Such a policy would greatly benefit consumer welfare, and allow the Commission to develop a method of rate regulation that benefits a greater percentage of subscribers.

C. Consumer Welfare Concerns -- Programming Diversity.

The Commission's benchmark scheme imposes a direct economic penalty on operators who add additional programming to their systems.

The inadvertent effect of this disincentive provides inordinate protection to broadcasters and can be expected to diminish consumer welfare at an increasing rate over time. Because the variables of the Commission's benchmark grid (system size, total number of channels, and number of satellite channels) do not relate to the



and gives economic incentive to drop channels with higher program license fees.

Northland believes the Commission's scheme is directly contrary to the statutory requirements of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 ("Cable Act"), which specifically contemplated a bifurcated regulatory structure. Reflecting a concern that cable service was becoming too expensive for some consumers, Congress clearly intended to insure the availability of a lower-priced less inclusive "basic" level of

regulate rates. Combining tiers will always have the effect of discouraging the addition of channels and therefore will diminish consumer welfare. Separate benchmarks for each basic tier of service (a basic tier being defined as one subscribed to by at least 85 percent of all system subscribers) computed independently of each other tier solves the problem. Furthermore, the benchmark should be established by reference to relevant cost factors such as channel capacity or subscriber density.

D. Consumer Welfare Concerns - A Low-Cost, Entry-Level Service.

Establishing an all broadcast basic tier provides a valuable service to many consumers, particularly in the many rural communities where off-air-signals are difficult to receive. In particular, it offers basic low-cost television to low-income families and to senior citizens or others on a fixed income. In such cases, an all broadcast basic tier competes with other tiers of service, just as if off-air signals were readily available. Therefore, it is imperative that the allowable benchmark rate of the all broadcast tier relate to actual cost of providing the service. Under the Commission's benchmark scheme, however, adding channels to tiers other than the

overall. Obviously, neither solution is in the consumer's best interest.

The following example illustrates the problem. Northland purchased a 3,700 subscriber system approximately eight years ago. The plant condition was old but in satisfactory condition. At the time of purchase, the system offered a 12-channel basic service for \$9.00 per subscriber per month, and the only other service offering was HBO. Northland has since completely rebuilt the cable system; every cable, amplifier, and connection is new. The system's capacity is now 59 channels, and the system offers a wide variety of services on 34 channels as well as access channels, services to schools, live church services, and governmental access. The basic service tier is composed of 12 channels and is sold for \$14.25 per month. This level of service is the sole service subscribed to by many, in particular, seniors and Hispanics (a Spanish language channel is on the basic service tier). The basic service tier also provides four satellite channels. The Commission's benchmark system would push the allowable rate for the basic service tier to \$7.56 per subscriber per month, which is below Northland's actual cost, especially considering the rebuild costs. (Ironically, the benchmark rate is even below the 1985 rate of \$9.00 per subscriber per month.) If the basic service tier were combined with the expanded basic tier, the problem could be solved. Unfortunately, many lower income subscribers probably would have to disconnect from cable. In this particular circumstance, however, Northland estimates the large majority would pay the higher



above, the benchmarks provide a financial penalty for operators adding additional services, especially local/regional and other non-satellite delivered programming. Without operator support through wide-spread distribution almost no fledgling network will be able to fully develop its services.

F. <u>Industry Concentration Concerns</u>. The Commission's regulations have a disproportionately burdensome effect on small cable operators and may cause a large number of business failures leading to a greater concentration of the cable industry in the hands of only a few large companies. The disastrous effect of the benchmark regulations on small cable operators has been discussed at length in the trade press³ and is commented on at greater length in Section IV of this Petition.

III. The Commission's Emphasis on Competitive Systems in Developing the Benchmarks Was Misplaced.

The Cable Act specifically requires the Commission to use seven factors in determining if operators' rates for the basic service tier are reasonable. The statute in no way directs or requires the Commission to focus on a particular factor or to eliminate or give diminished weight to other factors. Yet, the Commission admittedly failed to give anything but the most superficial consideration to operators' actual costs associated with the "obtaining, transmitting,

See e.g., Higgins, FCC Rate Rollbacks Clobbering MSOs, Multichannel News, May 31, 1993, p. 1.

Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §543(b)(2)(C).

and otherwise providing signals carried on the basic service tier."⁵ Failure to adhere to the Cable Act's mandate is arbitrary and capricious and is clear grounds for setting aside the benchmark regulatory scheme set forth in the Order.

Even after placing an undue emphasis on competitive systems, the Commission failed to take the obvious and critical second step to determine if the competitive cable systems included in the Commission's survey data were making a reasonable profit or if their operations were reasonably expected to have long-term going concern viability. It appears, for example, that no investigation whatsoever was made to determine whether the sample competitive systems were providing a reasonably high level of customer service; whether the systems' physical plant was in a condition to continue to provide quality service for the long-run; whether the systems had the capacity to add additional services as they are developed; whether the systems had adequate capital reserves to utilize technological innovations; or whether the systems were otherwise financially capable of responding to a changing marketplace. The Commission also failed to exclude from the sample of competitive systems those engaged in short-term price wars or those subject to other nonequilibrium situations.

Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §543(b)(2)(C)(ii).

⁶ The history of overbuilds in the cable industry is rife with examples of at- or below-cost rates designed to gain market share or to "greenmail" an incumbent operator into buying out the overbuilder.

Considering the huge variety of factors that affect cable systems' rates, the number of competitive systems used in the Commission's analysis was too small to permit the sort of regression analysis necessary to yield reliable results.

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Northland's system in Lyons, Oregon faces direct competition from a cable system operated by the local telephone company. Although the system is subject to "effective competition" under the Commission's rules, the system's basic rate is approximately 75¢ in excess of the Commission's allowable benchmark. Attached to this Petition as Exhibit A is a copy of the calculations used to determine the maximum initial permitted rate per channel for the Lyons system.

If the Lyons system, which serves approximately 210 subscribers, were forced to stand financially on its own, even with its current rate structure, it would not generate sufficient cash flow to service its existing debt or to continue to provide the quality of service needed to meet strong competition. Even with rates that exceed the benchmarks, it is extremely unlikely the Lyons system could obtain the working capital loans necessary to expand its services or to upgrade or rebuild its facilities.

IV. The Commission's Regulatory Scheme Places Too High A Burden on Small Systems.

The Cable Act specifically directed the Commission to "reduce the administrative burdens and cost of compliance" on small cable systems. 7 Notwithstanding that mandate, the Commission developed an

⁷ Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §543(i).

incredibly convoluted and exceedingly difficult scheme that places an overwhelming burden on small systems. Moreover, the Commission made no effort to analyze the cost of compliance with its regulatory scheme, especially the costs imposed on small systems that may find it necessary to file cost-of-service showings to justify rates in excess of the benchmarks.

The cost-of-service showing rules initially proposed by the Commission cannot be considered a safety net to be used by small operators because of the high expense associated with making such a Systems such as Northland's simply cannot afford to hire showing. the battery of economists, accountants, attorneys and other experts needed to prepare and present a cost-of-service showing. Commission may have fashioned a "remedy" that in reality is not available to those systems most in need of a cost-of-service proceeding to justify rates above the benchmark. Similarly, it is extremely unlikely that small franchising authorities will be able to undertake the expensive and time consuming process of holding costof-service hearings. Franchising authorities relying on the franchise fees paid by small operators are unlikely to have the financial ability to undertake complicated proceedings.

The complexity of the regulatory scheme and the burden on small systems was clearly illustrated by the Commission's own need to effect multiple revisions to the proposed forms and to release multiple clarifications of the rules.

V. <u>Conclusion</u>.

For the reasons stated above, Northland petitions the Commission to reconsider the benchmark methodology reflected in the <u>Order</u> and to modify the regulatory framework so that operators' free speech and editorial discretion is preserved and so the burden placed on small operators is lessened significantly.

Respectfully submitted,

NORTHLAND COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION

By

James M. Penney, Vice President

SUMMARY OF MAXIMUM INITIAL PERMITTED RATE PER CHANNEL CALCULATIONS

Lyons (City of Lyons, OR only)

Cable Operator Name: NCP-8

Franchise Authority:

Lyons, OR

06/16/93

MAXIMUM INITIAL PERMITTED RATE PER CHANNEL

\$0.558

MAXIMUM REGULATED RATE BY LEVEL OF SERVICE EST. TOTAL M.I.P. FRAN. ALLOWED CURRENT CHANNELS RATE **FEES** RATE RATE SPREAD **Economy Basic** 10 5.58 \$0.17 5.75 13.60 7.85 Satellite Basic 20 11.16 \$0.33 11.49 4.40 (7.09)STANDARD PACKAGE (1&2) \$0.50 \$17.24 \$18.00 30 \$16.74 0.76 Tier 0 \$0.00 N/A 0.00 \$0.00 0.00

TOTAL OPERATING AND CAPITAL COSTS FOR INSTALLATION & MAINTENANCE \$138,267 % OF OPERATING COSTS ALLOCATED TO CUSTOMER EQUIP. & INSTALLS 60% \$36.93

HOURLY SERVICE CHARGE ("HSC") % OF LABOR HOURS ALLOCATED TO CUSTOMER EQUIP. & INSTALLS

40%



File Name: N8LY_393.wq1

Worksheets for Calculating Maximum Initial Permitted Rate Per Channel for Basic Tier or Cable Programming Service

Lyons (City of Lyons, OR only)

Cable Operator Name: NCP-8

Community Unit ID:

06/16/93

Franchise Authority:

Lyons, OR

Basic Tier Cable Prog. (Circle One)

Page 1 of 2

Worksheet 1 Calculation of Rates in Effect on Initial Date of Regulation and Benchmark Comparison

			Α	В	С	D	E
Line	Line Description	Instruction	Basic	Tier 2	Tier 3	Tier 4	Total
101	Tier Charge (Monthly)	Enter for all Tiers Offered	13.60	4.40	0.00		
102	Tier Channels	Enter for all Tiers Offered	10	20	0		
103	Tier Subscribers	Enter for all Tiers Offered	210 _	207	0		
104	Equipment Revenue (Monthly)	Enter in Basic Column Only	\$381				
105	Charge Factor	(Line 101 * Line 103 + Line 104A)	3,237	911	0		4,148
106	Channel Factor	Line 102 * Line 103	2,100	4,140	0		6,240
107	Charge per Channel	Line 105E / Line 106E					0.66
108	Franchise Fee Expense (Monthly)	Enter Only Fees Included in Line 101 Charges [See Worksheet Instructions]				\$143	
109	Franchise Fee Deduction	Line 108E / Line 106E	Line 108E / Line 106E				
110	Base Rate Per Channel	Line 107E - Line 109E					0.642
121	Benchmark Channel Rate	Enter from Attachment A					0.720
122	GNP-PI (current)	Enter from Survey of Current Busine	Enter from Survey of Current Business, Table 7.3, Line 5, most recent quarter				124.1
123	Inflation Factor	(Line 122E / 121.8)-1 [121.8 = 3rd Qtr 1992 GNP-PI]				0.019	
124	Adjustment Time Period	Enter Number of Months from 9/30/92 to Date of Current Rate				٤	
125	GNP-PI Time Period	Enter Number of Months from 9/30/92 to most recent GNP-PI Quarter					
126	Time Factor	Line 124E / Line 125E				1.500	
127	Inflation Adjustment Factor	(Line 123E * Line 126E) + 1				1.02	
128	Adjusted Benchmark Rate	Line 121E * Line 127E					0.740

If Line 110E is less than or equal to Line 128E, skip to Worksheet 3 and enter Line 110E on Line 300. If Line 110E is greater than Line 128E, complete Worksheet 2.

Worksheet 2 Calculation of Rates in Effect on September 30, 1992 and Benchmark Comparison

			A	В	C	D	E
Line	Line Description	Instruction	Basic	Tier 2	Tier 3	Tier 4	Total
201	Tier Charge (Monthly)	Enter for all Tiers Offered	0.00	19.95	0.00		
202	Tier Channels	Enter for all Tiers Offered	0	24	0		
203	Tier Subscribers	Enter for all Tiers Offered	0 _	264	0		
204	Equipment Revenue (Monthly)	Enter in Basic Column Only	\$363				
205	Charge Factor	(Line 201 * Line 203 + Line 204A)	363	5,267	0	0	5,630
206	Channel Factor	Line 202 * Line 203	0	6,336	0	0	6,330
207	Charge per Channel	Line 205E / Line 206E					0.88
208	Franchise Fee Expense (Monthly)	Enter Only Fees Included in Line 201 Charges [See Worksheet Instructions]					\$13
209	Franchise Fee Deduction	Line 208E / Line 206E				_	0.02
210	Base Rate Per Channel	Line 207E - Line 209E				_	0.86
220	Benchmark Channel Rate	Enter from Attachment A					0.84
	If Line 210E is less than or equal to	Line 220E, go to Worksheet 3 and ente	r Line 220E oı	n Line 300.			
	If Line 210E is greater than Line 220	E, go to Line 230.					
		Line 210E * 0.9 ITen Percent Reduc				_	0.78

Cable Operator Name: NCP-8

Community Unit ID:

06/16/93

Franchise Authority:

Lyons, OR

Basic Tier Cable Prog. (Circle One)

Page 2 of 2

Worksheet 3

Removal of Equipment and Installation Costs

Line	Line Description	Instruction	
300	Base Rate Per Channel	Enter from Worksheet 1 (Line 110E) or Worksheet 2 (Line 220E or 230E)	0.642
301	Equip. & Install. Cost	Enter from Line 34 of Equipment Worksheet (Step G)	523
302	Channel Factor	Enter from Worksheet 1 (Line 108E) or Worksheet 2 (Line 206E)	6,240
303	Cost Per Subscriber-channel	Line 301 / Line 302	0.084
304	Base Service Rate per Channel	Line 300 - Line 303	0.558

If Line 300 entered from Worksheet 1, go to Line 600 and enter Line 304.

If Line 300 entered from Worksheet 2, got to Worksheet 4.

Worksheet 4

Adjustment for Inflation

Line	Line Description	Instruction	
400 (Base Service Rate per Channel	Enter from Line 304	0.55
401	Inflation Adjustment Factor	Enter from Worksheet 1, Line 127E	1.02
402	Adj. Base Ser. Rate per Channel	Line 400 * Line 401	0.574

If adjusted base service rate (Line 402) reflects current number of regulated channels, satellite channels, and subscribers, go to Line 600 and enter Line 402.

If it does not, complete Worksheet 5.

Worksheet 5

Adjustment for Changes in Number of Regulated Channels

ine Line Description	Instruction	
600 Adj. Base Ser. Rate per Channel	Enter from Worksheet 4 (Line 402) or Worksheet 3 (Line 304)	0.57
i01 Benchmark Chan. Rate (Baseline)	Enter from Worksheet 2 (Line 220E)	0.8
02 Benchmark Chan. Rate (New)	Enter from Worksheet 1 (Line 121E)	0.73
603 Channel Adjustment Factor	(Line 502 - Line 501) / Line 501	(0.1
i04 Ch. Adj. Base Ser. Rate per Ch.	Line 500 * (1 + Line 503)	0.4

If Worksheet 5 was used, enter Line 504 on Line 600.

	0.558	
600 Maximum Initial Permitted Rate per Channel Enter from Line 304, 402, or 504		